diff options
author | Lyuma <xn.lyuma@gmail.com> | 2023-09-24 20:04:06 -0700 |
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committer | Fabio Alessandrelli <fabio.alessandrelli@gmail.com> | 2024-04-10 21:19:22 +0200 |
commit | 40fa684c181d3138d8f86c70e5933fb0b3dcbac8 (patch) | |
tree | 4d104dfb95341e96ac2d98f9a9e3a85c5b7e55ca /thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c | |
parent | 6c579280630715ff7da8310d405ef34194847294 (diff) | |
download | redot-engine-40fa684c181d3138d8f86c70e5933fb0b3dcbac8.tar.gz |
mbedTLS: Update to new LTS v3.6.0
Keep module compatibility with mbedtls 2.x (old LTS branch).
A patch has been added to allow compiling after removing all the `psa_*`
files from the library folder (will look into upstreaming it).
Note: mbedTLS 3.6 finally enabled TLSv1.3 by default, but it requires
some module changes, and to enable PSA crypto (new "standard" API
specification), so it might be best done in a separate commit/PR.
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c')
-rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c | 4385 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 4385 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4fde783d3e..0000000000 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_cli.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4385 +0,0 @@ -/* - * SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions - * - * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors - * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later - */ - -#include "common.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - -#include "mbedtls/platform.h" - -#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" -#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" -#include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" -#include "psa/crypto.h" -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#include <string.h> - -#include <stdint.h> - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) -#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) -{ - if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || - conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { - return 1; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t hostname_len; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", - ssl->hostname)); - - hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); - - /* - * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) - * - * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an - * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The - * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain - * "ServerNameList" where: - * - * struct { - * NameType name_type; - * select (name_type) { - * case host_name: HostName; - * } name; - * } ServerName; - * - * enum { - * host_name(0), (255) - * } NameType; - * - * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; - * - * struct { - * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> - * } ServerNameList; - * - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); - - *olen = hostname_len + 9; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - /* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the - * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation - * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding renegotiation extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len); - - /* - * Secure renegotiation - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len + 1); - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len); - - memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); - - *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - -/* - * Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t sig_alg_len = 0; - const int *md; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6; -#endif - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_len += 2; -#endif - if (sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (sig_alg_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, sig_alg_len + 6); - - /* - * Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2) - */ - sig_alg_len = 0; - - for (md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); - sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; -#endif - } - - /* - * enum { - * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), - * sha512(6), (255) - * } HashAlgorithm; - * - * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } - * SignatureAlgorithm; - * - * struct { - * HashAlgorithm hash; - * SignatureAlgorithm signature; - * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; - * - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; - */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sig_alg_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + sig_alg_len; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6; - size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0; - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info; - const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id; - - *olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension")); - - if (ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - if (info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("invalid curve in ssl configuration")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - elliptic_curve_len += 2; - - if (elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - } - - /* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */ - if (elliptic_curve_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len); - - elliptic_curve_len = 0; - - for (grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list; - *grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; - grp_id++) { - info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(*grp_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(info->tls_id); - elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(info->tls_id); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(elliptic_curve_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len; - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ - - *olen = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 2; - - *p++ = 1; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; - - *olen = 6; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t kkpp_len; - - *olen = 0; - - /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ - if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); - p += 2; - - /* - * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification. - * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance - * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL || - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("generating new ecjpake parameters")); - - ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, - "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); - return ret; - } - - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc(1, kkpp_len); - if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("allocation failed")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - memcpy(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len); - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("re-using cached ecjpake parameters")); - - kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p + 2, end, kkpp_len); - - memcpy(p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len); - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = kkpp_len + 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t ext_len; - - /* - * Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 - * - * struct { - * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; - * } ConnectionId; - */ - - *olen = 0; - if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { - return 0; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding CID extension")); - - /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX - * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)); - - /* Add extension ID + size */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0); - p += 2; - ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; - memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); - - *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 1; - - *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; - - *olen = 5; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *p++ = 0x00; - *p++ = 0x00; - - *olen = 4; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, adding session ticket extension")); - - /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + tlen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, p, 0); - p += 2; - - *olen = 4; - - if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen)); - - memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen); - - *olen += tlen; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t alpnlen = 0; - const char **cur; - - *olen = 0; - - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - alpnlen += strlen(*cur) + 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6 + alpnlen); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); - p += 2; - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - */ - - /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ - p += 4; - - for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { - /* - * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of - * protocol names is less than 255. - */ - *p = (unsigned char) strlen(*cur); - memcpy(p + 1, *cur, *p); - p += 1 + *p; - } - - *olen = p - buf; - - /* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 6, buf, 4); - - /* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 4, buf, 2); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char *buf, - const unsigned char *end, - size_t *olen) -{ - unsigned char *p = buf; - size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; - uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; - - *olen = 0; - - if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || - (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || - (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { - return 0; - } - - /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 - * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; - * - * struct { - * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; - * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; - * } UseSRTPData; - * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; - */ - if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { - mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; - } - /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, - * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), - * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value - */ - ext_len = 2 + 2 * (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) + 1 + mki_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding use_srtp extension")); - - /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes - * - the extension tag (2 bytes) - * - the extension length (2 bytes) - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ext_len + 4); - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); - p += 2; - - /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ - /* micro-optimization: - * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH - * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 - * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments - * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) - * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); - */ - *p++ = 0; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len); - - for (protection_profiles_index = 0; - protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; - protection_profiles_index++) { - profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value - (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]); - if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", - profile_value)); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, p, 0); - p += 2; - } else { - /* - * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles - * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, " - "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", - ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] - )); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - } - } - - *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; - - if (mki_len != 0) { - memcpy(p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len); - /* - * Increment p to point to the current position. - */ - p += mki_len; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); - } - - /* - * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) - * + extension length (2 bytes) - * + protection profile length (2 bytes) - * + 2 * number of protection profiles - * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) - * + mki value - */ - *olen = p - buf; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ - -/* - * Generate random bytes for ClientHello - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - mbedtls_time_t t; -#endif - - /* - * When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1) - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL) { - return 0; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - t = mbedtls_time(NULL); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); - p += 4; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, - (long long) t)); -#else - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - p += 4; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ - - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - -/** - * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. - * - * \param suite_info cipher suite to validate - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite - * - * \return 0 if valid, else 1 - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, - const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver) -{ - (void) ssl; - if (suite_info == NULL) { - return 1; - } - - if (suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver || - suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver) { - return 1; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS)) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) - if (ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && - suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128) { - return 1; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && - mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif - - /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && - ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - return 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0; - - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *q; - const unsigned char *end; - - unsigned char offer_compress; - const int *ciphersuites; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - int uses_ec = 0; -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); - - if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; - } - - int renegotiating = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - renegotiating = 1; - } -#endif - if (!renegotiating) { - ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver; - ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver; - } - - if (ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - buf = ssl->out_msg; - end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; - - /* - * Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello - * consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at - * most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte). - * - * Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values - * to allow the compiler to optimize this away. - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32); - - /* - * The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello: - * 0 . 0 handshake type (written later) - * 1 . 3 handshake length (written later) - * 4 . 5 highest version supported - * 6 . 9 current UNIX time - * 10 . 37 random bytes - * - * The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written - * by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then - * copied from there into the output buffer. - */ - - p = buf + 4; - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); - p += 2; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, max version: [%d:%d]", - buf[4], buf[5])); - - if ((ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_generate_random", ret); - return ret; - } - - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32); - p += 32; - - /* - * 38 . 38 session id length - * 39 . 39+n session id - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; - - if (n < 16 || n > 32 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || -#endif - ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { - n = 0; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - /* - * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY - * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL && - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0) { - ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, - ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32); - - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - - /* - * The first check of the output buffer size above ( - * MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );) - * has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the - * session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32). - */ - *p++ = (unsigned char) n; - - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i]; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n); - - /* - * With 'n' being the length of the session identifier - * - * 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) - * 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. ciphersuitelist - * .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte) - * .. . .. compression methods - * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes) - * .. . .. extensions - */ - - /* - * DTLS cookie - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); - - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no verify cookie to send")); - *p++ = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - - *p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - memcpy(p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len); - p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len; - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Ciphersuite list - */ - ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; - - /* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */ - n = 0; - q = p; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - p += 2; - - for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { - ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuites[i]); - - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ciphersuite_info, ssl, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) != 0) { - continue; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", - (unsigned int) ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - - n++; - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ciphersuites[i], p, 0); - p += 2; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET - " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n)); - - /* - * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV - */ - if (!renegotiating) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } - - /* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) - if (ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding FALLBACK_SCSV")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0); - p += 2; - n++; - } -#endif - - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n >> 7); - *q++ = (unsigned char) (n << 1); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - offer_compress = 1; -#else - offer_compress = 0; -#endif - - /* - * We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come - * in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one. - * We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is - * an actual need for it. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - offer_compress = 0; - } -#endif - - if (offer_compress) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 2)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); - *p++ = 2; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress len.: %d", 1)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, compress alg.: %d", - MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - *p++ = 1; - *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; - } - - /* First write extensions, then the total length */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - - /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added - * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (uses_ec) { - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; - - if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; - } -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - if ((ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, - end, &olen)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret); - return ret; - } - ext_len += olen; -#endif - - /* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */ - ((void) olen); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - ext_len)); - - if (ext_len > 0) { - /* No need to check for space here, because the extension - * writing functions already took care of that. */ - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); - p += 2 + ext_len; - } - - ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO; - - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); - return ret; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { - /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ - if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || - buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || - mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, - ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0 || - mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, - ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - { - if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; - } - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - /* - * server should use the extension only if we did, - * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1) - */ - if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE || - len != 1 || - buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching max fragment length extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching truncated HMAC extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - size_t peer_cid_len; - - if ( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ - ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || - /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ - ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension unexpected")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - if (len == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - peer_cid_len = *buf++; - len--; - - if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - if (len != peer_cid_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; - ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; - memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching extended master secret extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || - len != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-matching session ticket extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - ((void) buf); - - ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - size_t list_size; - const unsigned char *p; - - if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - list_size = buf[0]; - - p = buf + 1; - while (list_size > 0) { - if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || - p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; -#endif - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); - return 0; - } - - list_size--; - p++; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no point format in common")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); - return 0; - } - - /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */ - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache); - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; - ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - buf, len)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - size_t list_len, name_len; - const char **p; - - /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ - if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching ALPN extension")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* - * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; - * - * struct { - * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> - * } ProtocolNameList; - * - * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" - */ - - /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ - if (len < 4) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - list_len = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; - if (list_len != len - 2) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - name_len = buf[2]; - if (name_len != list_len - 1) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ - for (p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++) { - if (name_len == strlen(*p) && - memcmp(buf + 3, *p, name_len) == 0) { - ssl->alpn_chosen = *p; - return 0; - } - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ALPN extension: no matching protocol")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - const unsigned char *buf, - size_t len) -{ - mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; - size_t i, mki_len = 0; - uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; - - /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ - if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || - (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || - (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { - return 0; - } - - /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 - * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; - * - * struct { - * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; - * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; - * } UseSRTPData; - - * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; - * - */ - if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { - mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; - } - - /* - * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) - * + protection profile (2 bytes) - * + mki_len(1 byte) - * and optional srtp_mki - */ - if ((len < 5) || (len != (buf[4] + 5u))) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* - * get the server protection profile - */ - - /* - * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only - * one protection profile in server Hello - */ - if ((buf[0] != 0) || (buf[1] != 2)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - server_protection_profile_value = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; - server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( - server_protection_profile_value); - if (server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( - server_protection))); - } - - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; - - /* - * Check we have the server profile in our list - */ - for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) { - if (server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) { - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s", - mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( - server_protection))); - break; - } - } - - /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ - if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep - * one as negotiated */ - if (len == 5) { - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; - } - - /* - * RFC5764: - * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response - * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client - * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. - */ - if (len > 5 && (buf[4] != mki_len || - (memcmp(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len)))) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if (len > 5) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, - ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); - } -#endif - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ - -/* - * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - int major_ver, minor_ver; - unsigned char cookie_len; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse hello verify request")); - - /* Check that there is enough room for: - * - 2 bytes of version - * - 1 byte of cookie_len - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* - * struct { - * ProtocolVersion server_version; - * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; - * } HelloVerifyRequest; - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p); - p += 2; - - /* - * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1) - * even is lower than our min version. - */ - if (major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 || - minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 || - major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server version")); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - cookie_len = *p++; - if ((ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen) - p < cookie_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("cookie length does not match incoming message size")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie", p, cookie_len); - - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); - - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); - if (ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - memcpy(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len; - - /* Start over at ClientHello */ - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; - mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); - - mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse hello verify request")); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - -static int is_compression_bad(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char comp) -{ - int bad_comp = 0; - - /* Suppress warnings in some configurations */ - (void) ssl; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif - - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL && - comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { - bad_comp = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */ - return bad_comp; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret, i; - size_t n; - size_t ext_len; - unsigned char *buf, *ext; - unsigned char comp; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; -#endif - int handshake_failure = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello")); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - /* No alert on a read error. */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - buf = ssl->in_msg; - - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { - ssl->renego_records_seen++; - - if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && - ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("renegotiation requested, but not honored by server")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("non-handshake message during renegotiation")); - - ssl->keep_current_message = 1; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - if (buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received hello verify request")); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); - return ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(ssl); - } else { - /* We made it through the verification process */ - mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->verify_cookie); - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL; - ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - if (ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) || - buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* - * 0 . 1 server_version - * 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time) - * 34 . 34 session_id length = n - * 35 . 34+n session_id - * 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite - * 37+n . 37+n compression_method - * - * 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional) - * 40+n . .. extensions - */ - buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2); - mbedtls_ssl_read_version(&ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0); - - if (ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver || - ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver || - ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ( - "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]", - ssl->conf->min_major_ver, - ssl->conf->min_minor_ver, - ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver)); - - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %lu", - ((unsigned long) buf[2] << 24) | - ((unsigned long) buf[3] << 16) | - ((unsigned long) buf[4] << 8) | - ((unsigned long) buf[5]))); - - memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32); - - n = buf[34]; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32); - - if (n > 32) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - if (ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 39 + n) { - ext_len = ((buf[38 + n] << 8) - | (buf[39 + n])); - - if ((ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) || - ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 40 + n + ext_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - } else if (ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 38 + n) { - ext_len = 0; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - /* ciphersuite (used later) */ - i = (buf[35 + n] << 8) | buf[36 + n]; - - /* - * Read and check compression - */ - comp = buf[37 + n]; - - if (is_compression_bad(ssl, comp)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server hello, bad compression: %d", comp)); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } - - /* - * Initialize update checksum functions - */ - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(i); - if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int) i)); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n); - - /* - * Check if the session can be resumed - */ - if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 || -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || -#endif - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || - ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp || - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || - memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n) != 0) { - ssl->state++; - ssl->handshake->resume = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) - ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); -#endif - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; - memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n); - } else { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed", - ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no")); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: %d", - buf[37 + n])); - - /* - * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. - */ - i = 0; - while (1) { - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] == - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { - break; - } - } - - suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( - ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); - if (ssl_validate_ciphersuite(suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver, - ssl->minor_ver) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; - } -#endif - - if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) - && comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE -#endif - ) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp; - - ext = buf + 40 + n; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, - ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, - ext_len)); - - while (ext_len) { - unsigned int ext_id = ((ext[0] << 8) - | (ext[1])); - unsigned int ext_size = ((ext[2] << 8) - | (ext[3])); - - if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - switch (ext_id) { - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension")); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - renegotiation_info_seen = 1; -#endif - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, - ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("found max_fragment_length extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found truncated_hmac extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, - ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt_then_mac extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("found extended_master_secret extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session_ticket extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("found supported_point_formats extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake_kkpp extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, - ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) - case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension")); - - if ((ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - break; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ - - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id)); - } - - ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; - ext += 4 + ext_size; - - if (ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - } - - /* - * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the - * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in - * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->resume) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return ret; - } - } - - /* - * Renegotiation security checks - */ - if (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); - handshake_failure = 1; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) - else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && - ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && - renegotiation_info_seen == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)")); - handshake_failure = 1; - } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && - ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == - MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed")); - handshake_failure = 1; - } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && - ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && - renegotiation_info_seen == 1) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)")); - handshake_failure = 1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ - - if (handshake_failure == 1) { - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); - - return 0; -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - size_t dhm_actual_bitlen; - - /* - * Ephemeral DH parameters: - * - * struct { - * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; - * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; - * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; - * } ServerDHParams; - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - p, end)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, ("mbedtls_dhm_read_params"), ret); - return ret; - } - - dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); - if (dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", - dhm_actual_bitlen, - ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY); - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; -#else - grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */ - - curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); - if (curve_info == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name)); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { - return -1; - } -#else - if (ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 || - ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521) { - return -1; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) -{ - uint16_t tls_id; - size_t ecdh_bits = 0; - uint8_t ecpoint_len; - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - /* - * Parse ECC group - */ - - if (end - *p < 4) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ - if (*(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ - tls_id = *(*p)++; - tls_id <<= 8; - tls_id |= *(*p)++; - - /* Check it's a curve we offered */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */ - if ((handshake->ecdh_psa_type = - mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group(tls_id, &ecdh_bits)) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - if (ecdh_bits > 0xffff) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits; - - /* - * Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA. - */ - - ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; - if ((size_t) (end - *p) < ecpoint_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec( - *p, ecpoint_len, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - sizeof(handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey), - &handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - *p += ecpoint_len; - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - - /* - * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: - * - * struct { - * ECParameters curve_params; - * ECPoint public; - * } ServerECDHParams; - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - (const unsigned char **) p, end)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_read_params"), ret); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif - return ret; - } - - if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - uint16_t len; - ((void) ssl); - - /* - * PSK parameters: - * - * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; - */ - if (end - (*p) < 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1]; - *p += 2; - - if (end - (*p) < len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one - * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if - * someone needs that feature. - */ - *p += len; - ret = 0; - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) -/* - * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key - */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - size_t offset, size_t *olen, - size_t pms_offset) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2; - unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; - mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; - - if (offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small for encrypted pms")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - /* - * Generate (part of) the pre-master as - * struct { - * ProtocolVersion client_version; - * opaque random[46]; - * } PreMasterSecret; - */ - mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->conf->max_major_ver, - ssl->conf->max_minor_ver, - ssl->conf->transport, p); - - if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); - return ret; - } - - ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { - /* Should never happen */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - /* - * Now write it out, encrypted - */ - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate key type mismatch")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt(peer_pk, - p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret); - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (len_bytes == 2) { - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen, ssl->out_msg, offset); - *olen += 2; - } -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ - mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, - mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg) -{ - ((void) ssl); - *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - - /* Only in TLS 1.2 */ - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - return 0; - } - - if ((*p) + 2 > end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get hash algorithm - */ - if ((*md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((*p)[0])) - == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Get signature algorithm - */ - if ((*pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig((*p)[1])) - == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - /* - * Check if the hash is acceptable - */ - if (mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash(ssl, *md_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0])); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[1])); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Server used HashAlgorithm %d", - (*p)[0])); - *p += 2; - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key; - mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { - /* Should never happen */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good - * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */ - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; - } - - peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec(*peer_pk); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, - MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); - return ret; - } - - if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, - * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive - * operations like ECDHE. */ - mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server key exchange")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - ((void) p); - ((void) end); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { - if ((ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - ((void) p); - ((void) end); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing) { - goto start_processing; - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - - /* - * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server - * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint - */ - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - /* Current message is probably either - * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */ - ssl->keep_current_message = 1; - goto exit; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("server key exchange message must not be skipped")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; - } - -start_processing: -#endif - p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, end - p); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { - if (ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } /* FALLTHROUGH */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { - ; /* nothing more to do */ - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { - if (ssl_parse_server_dh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { - ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - p, end - p); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { - size_t sig_len, hashlen; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; -#else - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; -#endif - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; - unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - size_t params_len = p - params; - void *rs_ctx = NULL; - - mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; - - /* - * Handle the digitally-signed structure - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - if (ssl_parse_signature_algorithm(ssl, &p, end, - &md_alg, &pk_alg) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - if (pk_alg != - mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); - - /* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */ - if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* - * Read signature - */ - - if (p > end - 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - sig_len = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; - p += 2; - - if (p != end - sig_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "signature", p, sig_len); - - /* - * Compute the hash that has been signed - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - hashlen = 36; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls(ssl, hash, params, - params_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, - params, params_len, - md_alg); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; -#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { - /* Should never happen */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - - /* - * Verify signature - */ - if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, - md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx)) != 0) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */ - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); - return ret; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) - /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, - * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive - * operations like ECDHE. */ - mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ - -exit: - ssl->state++; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server key exchange")); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); - - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; -} -#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - unsigned char *buf; - size_t n = 0; - size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); - - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - - ssl->state++; - ssl->client_auth = (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got %s certificate request", - ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); - - if (ssl->client_auth == 0) { - /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ - ssl->keep_current_message = 1; - goto exit; - } - - /* - * struct { - * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; - * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm - * supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only - * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; - * } CertificateRequest; - * - * Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just - * ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a - * certificate. - * - * We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out - * if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway, - * and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate - * the connection when it doesn't like our certificate. - * - * Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this - * point we only have one hash available (see comments in - * write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have. - * - * However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least - * superficially sane. - */ - buf = ssl->in_msg; - - /* certificate_types */ - if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } - cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)]; - n = cert_type_len; - - /* - * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf: - * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of - * SSL is 3), - * * distinguished name length otherwise. - * Both reach at most the index: - * ...hdr_len + 2 + n, - * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that - * regardless of the actual code path. - */ - if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } - - /* supported_signature_algorithms */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - size_t sig_alg_len = - ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - unsigned char *sig_alg; - size_t i; -#endif - - /* - * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: - * sig_alg[i + 1], - * where: - * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, - * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. - * Therefore the furthest access is: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], - * which reduces to: - * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], - * which is one less than we need the buf to be. - */ - if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) - + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; - for (i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, - ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d", - sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); - } -#endif - - n += 2 + sig_alg_len; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - - /* certificate_authorities */ - dn_len = ((buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n] << 8) - | (buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n])); - - n += dn_len; - if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; - } - -exit: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello done")); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - - if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) || - ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; - } - - ssl->state++; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { - mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); - } -#endif - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello done")); - - return 0; -} - -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - size_t header_len; - size_t content_len; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client key exchange")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) { - /* - * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P - */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4); - header_len = 6; - - ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), - &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; - - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - - unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; - size_t own_pubkey_len; - unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint; - size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - - header_len = 4; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); - - /* - * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. - */ - - /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by - * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While - * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes - * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not - * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. - * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation - * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ - key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); - psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); - psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type); - psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits); - - /* Generate ECDH private key. */ - status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, - &handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA - * and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */ - status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - own_pubkey, sizeof(own_pubkey), - &own_pubkey_len); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - if (mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint(own_pubkey, - own_pubkey_len, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint, - &own_pubkey_ecpoint_len) != 0) { - psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - /* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */ - ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len; - memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1, - own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len); - content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1; - - /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ - - /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ - status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, - handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster), - &ssl->handshake->pmslen); - - destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey); - handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - ( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { - /* - * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value - */ - header_len = 4; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret) { - goto ecdh_calc_secret; - } - - mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx); - } -#endif - - ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &content_len, - &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; - } - -ecdh_calc_secret: - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; - } -#endif - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->handshake->premaster, - MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) - if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(ciphersuite_info)) { - /* - * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; - */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, - * and we check that the server's choice is among the - * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - header_len = 4; - content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; - - if (header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len); - ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); - - memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len, - ssl->conf->psk_identity, - ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); - header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { - content_len = 0; - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, - &content_len, 2)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - /* - * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) - */ - content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len; - - if (header_len + 2 + content_len > - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; - } - - ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len); - ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); - - ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, - (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P), - &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) - /* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */ - if (ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - - /* - * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; - */ - ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - &content_len, - &ssl->out_msg[header_len], - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK && - ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && - ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, - ("skip PMS generation for opaque PSK")); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && - MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, - ciphersuite_info->key_exchange)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, - "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { - header_len = 4; - if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, - &content_len, 0)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) - if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { - header_len = 4; - - ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - ssl->out_msg + header_len, - MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, - &content_len, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret); - return ret; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, - ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); - return ret; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ - { - ((void) ciphersuite_info); - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; - - ssl->state++; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client key exchange")); - - return 0; -} - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; -} -#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = - ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; - size_t n = 0, offset = 0; - unsigned char hash[48]; - unsigned char *hash_start = hash; - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - size_t hashlen; - void *rs_ctx = NULL; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign) { - goto sign; - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - - if (ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); - ssl->state++; - return 0; - } - - if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key for certificate")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; - } - - /* - * Make a signature of the handshake digests - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; - } - -sign: -#endif - - ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) - if (ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque md5_hash[16]; - * opaque sha_hash[20]; - * }; - * - * md5_hash - * MD5(handshake_messages); - * - * sha_hash - * SHA(handshake_messages); - */ - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - - /* - * For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only - */ - if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { - hash_start += 16; - hashlen -= 16; - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; - } - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) - if (ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3) { - /* - * digitally-signed struct { - * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; - * }; - * - * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the - * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature - * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. - * - * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this - * shortcut. - * - * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and - * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server - * side. - */ - if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; - } else { - md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; - ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; - } - ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); - - /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ - hashlen = 0; - offset = 2; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ - { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { - rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; - } -#endif - - if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), - md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, - ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n, - ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; - } -#endif - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4); - - ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset; - ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; - ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; - - ssl->state++; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify")); - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - uint32_t lifetime; - size_t ticket_len; - unsigned char *ticket; - const unsigned char *msg; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket")); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( - ssl, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - } - - /* - * struct { - * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; - * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; - * } NewSessionTicket; - * - * 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint - * 4 . 5 ticket_len (n) - * 6 . 5+n ticket content - */ - if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET || - ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; - } - - msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); - - lifetime = (((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24) | (msg[1] << 16) | - (msg[2] << 8) | (msg[3]); - - ticket_len = (msg[4] << 8) | (msg[5]); - - if (ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) != ssl->in_hslen) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len)); - - /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ - ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - - /* - * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want - * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it - */ - if (ticket_len == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session->ticket, - ssl->session->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session->ticket); - ssl->session->ticket = NULL; - ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; - } - - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len); - mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket); - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; - - if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed")); - mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; - } - - memcpy(ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len); - - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket; - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len; - ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; - - /* - * RFC 5077 section 3.4: - * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it - * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello." - */ - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket in use, discarding session id")); - ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0; - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket")); - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ - -/* - * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step - */ -int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = 0; - - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %d", ssl->state)); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) - if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && - ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ - - /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used - * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && - ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; - } -#endif - - switch (ssl->state) { - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; - break; - - /* - * ==> ClientHello - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: - ret = ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); - break; - - /* - * <== ServerHello - * Certificate - * ( ServerKeyExchange ) - * ( CertificateRequest ) - * ServerHelloDone - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: - ret = ssl_parse_server_hello(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: - ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: - ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: - ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done(ssl); - break; - - /* - * ==> ( Certificate/Alert ) - * ClientKeyExchange - * ( CertificateVerify ) - * ChangeCipherSpec - * Finished - */ - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: - ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: - ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl); - break; - - /* - * <== ( NewSessionTicket ) - * ChangeCipherSpec - * Finished - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: - ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(ssl); - break; -#endif - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl); - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); - ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; - break; - - case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl); - break; - - default: - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ |