diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c | 1440 |
1 files changed, 924 insertions, 516 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c index 0a0c2e3880..7eb4a259ea 100644 --- a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c +++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/rsa.c @@ -28,33 +28,545 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" -#include "bignum_internal.h" +#include "md_psa.h" #include <string.h> -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -#include "mbedtls/md.h" -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) #include <stdlib.h> #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (key + keylen); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define RSA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define RSA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]); + + + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT)); + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0); + pad_done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1); + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done)); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count)); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if( + bad, + MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) + ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11); + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if (output_max_len != 0) { + memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); + } + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *N, @@ -62,7 +574,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) || (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) || @@ -87,7 +598,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len) { int ret = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); if (N != NULL) { MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len)); @@ -217,8 +727,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #endif int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0); have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0); have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0); @@ -317,7 +825,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = 0; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -367,7 +874,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -410,7 +916,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int is_priv; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); /* Check if key is private or public */ is_priv = @@ -444,17 +949,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Initialize an RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int padding, - int hash_id) +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); - mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(ctx, padding, hash_id); + ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; + ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been @@ -467,27 +967,71 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Set padding for an existing RSA context */ -void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, - int hash_id) +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id) { - RSA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE(padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 || - padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21); + switch (padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && + (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + /* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ ctx->padding = padding; ctx->hash_id = hash_id; + + return 0; } /* - * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + * Get padding mode of initialized RSA context */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->padding; +} +/* + * Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->hash_id; +} + +/* + * Get length in bits of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N); +} + +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { return ctx->len; } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) /* @@ -504,8 +1048,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; int prime_quality = 0; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); /* * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of @@ -520,7 +1062,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); - if (nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; } @@ -620,8 +1167,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; } @@ -644,8 +1189,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) */ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 || rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -672,9 +1215,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(pub != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(prv != NULL); - if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; @@ -698,9 +1238,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t olen; mbedtls_mpi T; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -812,17 +1349,15 @@ cleanup: static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); const size_t nlimbs = N->n; - const size_t tlimbs = 2 * (nlimbs + 1); - - mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_montmul_init(N->p); - + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); @@ -830,12 +1365,13 @@ static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) /* T = T * Vf mod N * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N - * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand, yielding a - * result that's also * R mod N (aka "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we - * only multiply one operand by R mod N, so the result is directly what we - * want - no need to call `mpi_montred()` on it. */ - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(T, &RR, N, mm, &M_T); - mbedtls_mpi_montmul(T, Vf, N, mm, &M_T); + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); cleanup: @@ -892,30 +1428,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; #else /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, - f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */) != 0) { + 1 /* blinding on */) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -932,14 +1459,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); #endif - } #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); @@ -956,62 +1481,53 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Blinding - * T = T * Vi mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - /* - * Exponent blinding - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - /* - * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); - D = &D_blind; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); #else - /* - * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, - &ctx->DP)); - - DP = &DP_blind; - - /* - * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, - f_rng, p_rng)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, - &ctx->DQ)); + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP)); - DQ = &DQ_blind; + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - } - - /* Make a copy of the input (after blinding if there was any) */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); #else /* * Faster decryption using the CRT @@ -1020,8 +1536,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); /* * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P @@ -1045,13 +1561,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - if (f_rng != NULL) { - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); - } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); olen = ctx->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); @@ -1067,14 +1581,12 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); - if (f_rng != NULL) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); #else - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); #endif - } mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); @@ -1100,22 +1612,35 @@ cleanup: * \param dlen length of destination buffer * \param src source of the mask generation * \param slen length of the source buffer - * \param md_ctx message digest context to use + * \param md_alg message digest to use */ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, - size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx) + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) { - unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char counter[4]; unsigned char *p; unsigned int hlen; size_t i, use_len; + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - memset(mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE); - memset(counter, 0, 4); + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_ctx->md_info); + memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask)); + memset(counter, 0, 4); /* Generate and apply dbMask */ p = dst; @@ -1126,16 +1651,16 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, use_len = dlen; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(md_ctx)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { goto exit; } @@ -1150,9 +1675,82 @@ static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask)); + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); return ret; } + +/** + * Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6. + * + * \param hash the input hash + * \param hlen length of the input hash + * \param salt the input salt + * \param slen length of the input salt + * \param out the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + * \param md_alg message digest to use + */ +static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Compute a hash. + * + * \param md_alg algorithm to use + * \param input input message to hash + * \param ilen input length + * \param output the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + */ +static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) @@ -1162,7 +1760,6 @@ exit: int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1172,31 +1769,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } if (f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } olen = ctx->len; - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); /* first comparison checks for overflow */ if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) { @@ -1215,7 +1798,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; /* Construct DB */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, p)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p); + if (ret != 0) { return ret; } p += hlen; @@ -1225,33 +1809,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + return ret; } /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - if (ret != 0) { + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { return ret; } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1261,8 +1831,7 @@ exit: */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + void *p_rng, size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { @@ -1270,16 +1839,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = output; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - olen = ctx->len; /* first comparison checks for overflow */ @@ -1290,33 +1849,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; *p++ = 0; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - if (f_rng == NULL) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - int rng_dl = 100; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; - do { - ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); - } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); + while (nb_pad-- > 0) { + int rng_dl = 100; - /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ - if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); - } + do { + ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); + } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); - p++; + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); } - } else { - *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; - while (nb_pad-- > 0) { - *p++ = 0xFF; - } + p++; } *p++ = 0; @@ -1324,9 +1876,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(p, input, ilen); } - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ @@ -1336,26 +1886,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t ilen, + size_t ilen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ilen == 0 || input != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, - input, output); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, ilen, input, output); #endif @@ -1371,7 +1915,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, @@ -1380,26 +1923,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t ilen, i, pad_len; - unsigned char *p, pad_done; - int bad; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned int hlen; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(label_len == 0 || label != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); /* * Parameters sanity checks */ - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1409,13 +1942,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - // checking for integer underflow if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1424,9 +1955,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * RSA operation */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; @@ -1435,26 +1964,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* * Unmask data and generate lHash */ - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - goto cleanup; - } - /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, - &md_ctx)) != 0 || + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 || /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { goto cleanup; } - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - /* Generate lHash */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, label, label_len, lhash)) != 0) { + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, + label, label_len, lhash); + if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -1462,27 +1984,26 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Check contents, in "constant-time" */ p = buf; - bad = 0; - bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */ p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ /* Check lHash */ - bad |= mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen))); p += hlen; /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ pad_len = 0; - pad_done = 0; + in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) { - pad_done |= p[i]; - pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char) -pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0)); + pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1); } p += pad_len; - bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01)); /* * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not @@ -1490,17 +2011,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between * the different error conditions. */ - if (bad != 0) { + if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; goto cleanup; } - if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len) { + if (ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)) > output_max_len) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; goto cleanup; } - *olen = ilen - (p - buf); + *olen = ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)); if (*olen != 0) { memcpy(output, p, *olen); } @@ -1521,7 +2042,6 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, @@ -1531,16 +2051,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t ilen; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - ilen = ctx->len; - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1548,15 +2061,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, input, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } - ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(mode, buf, ilen, + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen, output, output_max_len, olen); cleanup: @@ -1572,28 +2083,21 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, size_t *olen, + size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, size_t output_max_len) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); - switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, olen, input, output, output_max_len); #endif @@ -1604,15 +2108,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) -static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - unsigned int hashlen, - const unsigned char *hash, - int saltlen, - unsigned char *sig) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) { size_t olen; unsigned char *p = sig; @@ -1620,17 +2123,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1642,21 +2137,25 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hash_id = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id; + if (hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + hash_id = md_alg; + } + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) { /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length @@ -1694,26 +2193,10 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += slen; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, 8)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, p)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ @@ -1722,9 +2205,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ - if ((ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, - &md_ctx)) != 0) { - goto exit; + ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; @@ -1733,16 +2216,38 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, p += hlen; *p++ = 0xBC; -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +} - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) && (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, + sig); +} - return (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } /* @@ -1758,24 +2263,22 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int saltlen, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig); } - /* * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ @@ -1792,14 +2295,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Parameters: * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. - * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. * * Assumptions: - * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. - * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. + * - hash has size hashlen. * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. * */ @@ -1816,8 +2318,8 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_size == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1825,7 +2327,9 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != md_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ @@ -1922,7 +2426,6 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -1931,15 +2434,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -1952,15 +2451,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return ret; } - /* - * Call respective RSA primitive - */ - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) { - /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ - return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, sig); - } - /* Private key operation * * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a @@ -1989,10 +2479,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len); cleanup: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sig_try, ctx->len); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(verif, ctx->len); - mbedtls_free(sig_try); - mbedtls_free(verif); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len); if (ret != 0) { memset(sig, '!', ctx->len); @@ -2007,30 +2495,25 @@ cleanup: int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, - hashlen, hash, sig); + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2044,9 +2527,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2059,22 +2539,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, unsigned char *p; unsigned char *hash_start; unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; - unsigned char zeros[8]; unsigned int hlen; size_t observed_salt_len, msb; - const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; - mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; - unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2084,9 +2553,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -2100,23 +2567,21 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { /* Gather length of hash to sign */ - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); - if (md_info == NULL) { + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } } - md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); - if (md_info == NULL) { + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); - - memset(zeros, 0, 8); - /* * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits */ @@ -2137,14 +2602,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; - mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); - if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { - goto exit; - } - - ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx); + ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb); @@ -2154,81 +2614,54 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, } if (*p++ != 0x01) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } - observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; + observed_salt_len = (size_t) (hash_start - p); if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; } /* * Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ - ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx); + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len, + result, mgf1_hash_id); if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, 8); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hashlen); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; - } - ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, result); - if (ret != 0) { - goto exit; + return ret; } if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; - goto exit; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } -exit: - mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); - - return ret; + return 0; } /* * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id : md_alg; - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, - mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + mgf1_hash_id, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); } @@ -2239,9 +2672,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function */ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, @@ -2251,20 +2681,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, size_t sig_len; unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); - - sig_len = ctx->len; - - if (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + sig_len = ctx->len; + /* * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. */ @@ -2284,9 +2706,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. */ - ret = (mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC) - ? mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded) - : mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -2304,13 +2724,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, cleanup: if (encoded != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len); } if (encoded_expected != NULL) { - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(encoded_expected, sig_len); - mbedtls_free(encoded_expected); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len); } return ret; @@ -2321,32 +2739,25 @@ cleanup: * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest */ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, - int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), - void *p_rng, - int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *sig) { - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE || - mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(sig != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET((md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && - hashlen == 0) || - hash != NULL); + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } switch (ctx->padding) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: - return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); #endif @@ -2361,8 +2772,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(dst != NULL); - RSA_VALIDATE_RET(src != NULL); dst->len = src->len; @@ -2436,7 +2845,6 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" /* * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes @@ -2514,14 +2922,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) unsigned char sha1sum[20]; #endif mbedtls_mpi K; mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); - mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0); + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); @@ -2556,7 +2964,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN); - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2571,7 +2979,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { @@ -2595,12 +3003,13 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : "); } - if (mbedtls_sha1_ret(rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); } @@ -2609,7 +3018,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) } if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2623,8 +3032,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: "); } - if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, NULL, NULL, - MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); @@ -2637,7 +3045,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ if (verbose != 0) { mbedtls_printf("\n"); |