summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c')
-rw-r--r--thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c4432
1 files changed, 4432 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b49a8ae6a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4432 @@
+/*
+ * TLS server-side functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "ssl_misc.h"
+#include "debug_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
+ ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
+ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *info,
+ size_t ilen)
+{
+ if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id);
+
+ if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen);
+ ssl->cli_id_len = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
+ void *p_cookie)
+{
+ conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write;
+ conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check;
+ conf->p_cookie = p_cookie;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf)
+{
+ if (conf->f_psk != NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
+ if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len ||
+ buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len ||
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data,
+ ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+ {
+ if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic
+ * curves (TLS 1.2) extension.
+ *
+ * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a
+ * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446):
+ * enum {
+ * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
+ * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
+ * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
+ * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
+ * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
+ * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ * (0xFFFF)
+ * } NamedGroup;
+ * struct {
+ * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>;
+ * } NamedGroupList;
+ *
+ * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains
+ * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422):
+ * enum {
+ * deprecated(1..22),
+ * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25),
+ * x25519(29), x448(30),
+ * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02),
+ * (0xFFFF)
+ * } NamedCurve;
+ * struct {
+ * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1>
+ * } NamedCurveList;
+ *
+ * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible
+ * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both
+ * share the same extension identifier.
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ size_t list_size, our_size;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ uint16_t *curves_tls_id;
+
+ if (len < 2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0);
+ if (list_size + 2 != len ||
+ list_size % 2 != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */
+ if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
+ * and leave room for a final 0 */
+ our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
+ if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) {
+ our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;
+ }
+
+ if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size,
+ sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id;
+
+ p = buf + 2;
+ while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) {
+ uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0);
+
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) !=
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+ *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id;
+ our_size--;
+ }
+
+ list_size -= 2;
+ p += 2;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ size_t list_size;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ list_size = buf[0];
+
+ p = buf + 1;
+ while (list_size > 0) {
+ if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
+ p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED)
+ ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p[0]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0]));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ list_size--;
+ p++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1)
+#else
+ if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+ &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+ psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret);
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
+ ssl,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ buf, len)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret);
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
+ ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ size_t peer_cid_len;
+
+ /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
+ if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+ * } ConnectionId;
+ */
+
+ if (len < 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ peer_cid_len = *buf++;
+ len--;
+
+ if (len != peer_cid_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */
+ if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+ /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default
+ * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+ ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
+ memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (len != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ((void) buf);
+
+ if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (len != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ((void) buf);
+
+ if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) {
+ ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session session;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session);
+
+ if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL ||
+ ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len));
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+ /*
+ * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed.
+ */
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session,
+ buf, len)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic"));
+ } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired"));
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to
+ * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4)
+ */
+ session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+ memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len);
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate);
+ memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+
+ /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket"));
+
+ ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
+
+ /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+ size_t i, j;
+ size_t profile_length;
+ uint16_t mki_length;
+ /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */
+ const size_t size_of_lengths = 3;
+
+ /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
+ if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+ (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) ||
+ (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1
+ * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
+ * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
+ * } UseSRTPData;
+
+ * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes)
+ * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte)
+ * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length
+ * and one of srtp_mki length
+ */
+ if (len < size_of_lengths) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
+
+ /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */
+ profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1];
+ buf += 2;
+
+ /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */
+ if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths ||
+ profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * parse the extension list values are defined in
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) {
+ uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1];
+ client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value);
+
+ if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+ client_protection)));
+ } else {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* check if suggested profile is in our list */
+ for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) {
+ if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) {
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
+ client_protection)));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */
+ mki_length = *buf;
+ buf++;
+
+ if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH ||
+ mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */
+ if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED &&
+ mki_length > 0) {
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length;
+
+ memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+/*
+ * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/*
+ * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ uint16_t *curves_tls_id)
+{
+ uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id;
+
+ while (*curr_tls_id != 0) {
+ curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id);
+ if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ curr_tls_id++;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite,
+ * return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info)
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_algorithm_t pk_alg =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+ psa_key_usage_t pk_usage =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info);
+#else
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ uint32_t flags;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) {
+ list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert;
+ } else
+#endif
+ list = ssl->conf->key_cert;
+
+ int pk_alg_is_none = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE);
+#else
+ pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ if (pk_alg_is_none) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate"));
+
+ if (list == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ flags = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate",
+ cur->cert);
+
+ int key_type_matches = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL ||
+ ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL ||
+ mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) &&
+ mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage));
+#else
+ key_type_matches = (
+ mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage));
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+#else
+ key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ if (!key_type_matches) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type"));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on
+ * keyUsage or other extensions.
+ *
+ * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for
+ * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing
+ * and decrypting with the same RSA key.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: "
+ "(extended) key usage extension"));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA &&
+ ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk,
+ ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve"));
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get there, we got a winner */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */
+ if (cur != NULL) {
+ ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate",
+ ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/*
+ * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc
+ * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type;
+#endif
+
+ suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id);
+ if (suite_info == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
+ (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name));
+
+ if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version ||
+ suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
+ (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake "
+ "not configured or ext missing"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) &&
+ (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL ||
+ ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
+ "no common elliptic curve"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+ /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't
+ * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) &&
+ ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ /*
+ * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a
+ * certificate/key of a particular type:
+ * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or
+ * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't
+ * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list.
+ */
+ if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: "
+ "no suitable certificate"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether
+ * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */
+ sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info);
+ if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE &&
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+ ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm "
+ "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+ *ciphersuite_info = suite_info;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during
+ ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is
+ not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret, got_common_suite;
+ size_t i, j;
+ size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset;
+ size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len;
+#endif
+ unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
+#endif
+ int handshake_failure = 0;
+ const int *ciphersuites;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+
+ /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present,
+ * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed
+ * signature-hash pairs. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello"));
+
+ int renegotiating;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+read_record_header:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(),
+ * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2
+ * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format.
+ * Otherwise in a scenario of TLS 1.3/TLS 1.2 version negotiation, the
+ * ClientHello has been already fully fetched by the TLS 1.3 code and the
+ * flag ssl->keep_current_message is raised.
+ */
+ renegotiating = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE);
+#endif
+ if (!renegotiating && !ssl->keep_current_message) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) {
+ /* No alert on a read error. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf = ssl->in_hdr;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl));
+
+ /*
+ * TLS Client Hello
+ *
+ * Record layer:
+ * 0 . 0 message type
+ * 1 . 2 protocol version
+ * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number
+ * 3 . 4 message length
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d",
+ buf[0]));
+
+ if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d",
+ MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0)));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]",
+ buf[1], buf[2]));
+
+ /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence
+ * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
+#endif
+ ) {
+ /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */
+ if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2,
+ sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record, discarding"));
+ ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
+ ssl->in_left = 0;
+ goto read_record_header;
+ }
+
+ /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */
+ mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl);
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
+ msg_len = ssl->in_hslen;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (ssl->keep_current_message) {
+ ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl);
+ } else
+#endif
+ ssl->in_left = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf = ssl->in_msg;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len);
+
+ ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len);
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Handshake layer:
+ * 0 . 0 handshake type
+ * 1 . 3 handshake length
+ * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number
+ * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset
+ * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length
+ */
+ if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0]));
+
+ if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+ {
+ size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u",
+ (unsigned) handshake_len));
+
+ /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and
+ * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */
+ if (buf[1] != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0",
+ (unsigned) buf[1]));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */
+ if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u",
+ (unsigned) msg_len,
+ (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl),
+ (unsigned) handshake_len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ /*
+ * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes,
+ * check sequence number on renego.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */
+ unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4);
+ if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: "
+ "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq,
+ ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4);
+ ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq;
+ ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1;
+ }
+ {
+ /*
+ * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure
+ * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length
+ */
+ size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length;
+ fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6);
+ fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9);
+ length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+ 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u",
+ (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length,
+ (unsigned) length));
+ if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+ msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+ /*
+ * ClientHello layout:
+ * 0 . 1 protocol version
+ * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time)
+ * 34 . 34 session id length (1 byte)
+ * 35 . 34+x session id, where x = session id length from byte 34
+ * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
+ * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie
+ * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes)
+ * .. . .. ciphersuite list
+ * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte)
+ * .. . .. compression alg. list
+ * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional)
+ * .. . .. extensions (optional)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is
+ * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
+ * read at least up to session id length without worrying.
+ */
+ if (msg_len < 38) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check and save the protocol version
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2);
+
+ ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf,
+ ssl->conf->transport);
+ ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
+ ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint;
+
+ if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save client random (inc. Unix time)
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32);
+
+ memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the session ID length and save session ID
+ */
+ sess_len = buf[34];
+
+ if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) ||
+ sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) { /* 2 for cipherlist length field */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len);
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len;
+ memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0,
+ sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id));
+ memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the cookie length and content
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len;
+ cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset];
+
+ if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie",
+ buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+ if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE
+#endif
+ ) {
+ if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+ buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len,
+ ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed"));
+ ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1;
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed"));
+ ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+ {
+ /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */
+ if (cookie_len != 0) {
+ /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped"));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later)
+ */
+ ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len;
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+ ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len;
+
+ ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset);
+
+ if (ciph_len < 2 ||
+ ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */
+ (ciph_len % 2) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist",
+ buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the compression algorithm's length.
+ * The list contents are ignored because implementing
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only
+ * option supported by Mbed TLS.
+ */
+ comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len;
+
+ comp_len = buf[comp_offset];
+
+ if (comp_len < 1 ||
+ comp_len > 16 ||
+ comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression",
+ buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check the extension length
+ */
+ ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len;
+ if (msg_len > ext_offset) {
+ if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset);
+
+ if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ext_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ ext = buf + ext_offset + 2;
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len);
+
+ while (ext_len != 0) {
+ unsigned int ext_id;
+ unsigned int ext_size;
+ if (ext_len < 4) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0);
+ ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2);
+
+ if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ switch (ext_id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension"));
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4,
+ ext + 4 + ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension"));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
+#endif
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension"));
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1;
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported point formats extension"));
+ ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT;
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found max fragment length extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found extended master secret extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension"));
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4,
+ ext + 4 + ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension"));
+
+ ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)",
+ ext_id));
+ }
+
+ ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
+ ext += 4 + ext_size;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+
+ /*
+ * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client
+ * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations.
+ */
+ if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) {
+ uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
+ const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1),
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1),
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE
+ };
+
+ MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0])
+ <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE,
+ "default_sig_algs is too big");
+
+ memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs));
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+ /*
+ * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
+ */
+ for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) {
+ if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO "));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV "
+ "during renegotiation"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+#endif
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Renegotiation security checks
+ */
+ if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake"));
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ renegotiation_info_seen == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)"));
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed"));
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
+ ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
+ renegotiation_info_seen == 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)"));
+ handshake_failure = 1;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+ if (handshake_failure == 1) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions)
+ */
+ if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL;
+ ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Search for a matching ciphersuite
+ * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions
+ * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension
+ * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.)
+ */
+ got_common_suite = 0;
+ ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
+ ciphersuite_info = NULL;
+
+ if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) {
+ for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) {
+ for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ got_common_suite = 1;
+
+ if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
+ &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
+ goto have_ciphersuite;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) {
+ for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) {
+ if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ got_common_suite = 1;
+
+ if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i],
+ &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) {
+ goto have_ciphersuite;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_common_suite) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, "
+ "but none of them usable"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common"));
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+have_ciphersuite:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name));
+
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i];
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+ if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
+ unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+ ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u",
+ sig_hash));
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm "
+ "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello"));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ size_t ext_len;
+ const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if
+ * the client hasn't offered it. */
+ if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
+ * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
+ if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension"));
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
+ * } ConnectionId;
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+ ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
+ memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len);
+
+ *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM)
+static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension
+ * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption
+ * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an
+ * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client."
+ */
+ suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+ if (suite == NULL) {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED;
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite(
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac,
+ suite);
+
+ if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret "
+ "extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+
+ *olen = 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF;
+ *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF;
+
+ memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
+ p += ssl->verify_data_len;
+ memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len);
+ p += ssl->verify_data_len;
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+ {
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 0x01;
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ }
+
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 1;
+
+ *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code;
+
+ *olen = 5;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ ((void) ssl);
+
+ if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts &
+ MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *p++ = 0x00;
+ *p++ = 2;
+
+ *p++ = 1;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+ *olen = 6;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ size_t kkpp_len;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ /* Skip costly computation if not needed */
+ if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension"));
+
+ if (end - p < 4) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+ p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+ psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+ return;
+ }
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ *olen = kkpp_len + 4;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0;
+ uint16_t profile_value = 0;
+ const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) ||
+ (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension"));
+
+ if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) {
+ mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
+ }
+
+ /* The extension total size is 9 bytes :
+ * - 2 bytes for the extension tag
+ * - 2 bytes for the total size
+ * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length
+ * - 2 bytes for the protection profile
+ * - 1 byte for the mki length
+ * + the actual mki length
+ * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */
+ if ((size_t) (end - buf) < mki_len + 9) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* extension */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0);
+ /*
+ * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes)
+ * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki )
+ */
+ ext_len = 5 + mki_len;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, buf, 2);
+
+ /* protection profile length: 2 */
+ buf[4] = 0x00;
+ buf[5] = 0x02;
+ profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
+ ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
+ if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) {
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, buf, 6);
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF;
+ memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len);
+
+ *olen = 9 + mki_len;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4;
+ unsigned char *cookie_len_byte;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request"));
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ProtocolVersion server_version;
+ * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
+ * } HelloVerifyRequest;
+ */
+
+ /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated
+ * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2);
+ p += 2;
+
+ /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */
+ if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip length byte until we know the length */
+ cookie_len_byte = p++;
+
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie,
+ &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN,
+ ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char) (p - (cookie_len_byte + 1));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte);
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg);
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request"));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp;
+ mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate;
+
+ /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init().
+ * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */
+ if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (session->id_len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp);
+
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache,
+ session->id,
+ session->id_len,
+ &session_tmp);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) {
+ /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Move semantics */
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session);
+ *session = session_tmp;
+ memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp));
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache"));
+ ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
+
+exit:
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp);
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ mbedtls_time_t t;
+#endif
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n;
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated"));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));
+
+ return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */
+
+ /*
+ * 0 . 0 handshake type
+ * 1 . 3 handshake length
+ * 4 . 5 protocol version
+ * 6 . 9 UNIX time()
+ * 10 . 37 random bytes
+ */
+ buf = ssl->out_msg;
+ p = buf + 4;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version);
+ p += 2;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]",
+ buf[4], buf[5]));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ t = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0);
+ p += 4;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
+ (long long) t));
+#else
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ p += 4;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ p += 20;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ /*
+ * RFC 8446
+ * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's
+ * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in
+ * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random
+ * value specially in their ServerHello.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) {
+ static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] =
+ { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 };
+
+ MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(
+ sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8,
+ "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size");
+
+ memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string,
+ sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string));
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ p += 8;
+
+ memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32);
+
+ ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl);
+
+ if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) {
+ /*
+ * New session, create a new session id,
+ * unless we're about to issue a session ticket
+ */
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0;
+ memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+ {
+ ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id,
+ n)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Resuming a session
+ */
+ n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 38 . 38 session id length
+ * 39 . 38+n session id
+ * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite
+ * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg.
+ * 42+n . 43+n extensions length
+ * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions
+ */
+ *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+ memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len);
+ p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed",
+ ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)));
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X",
+ (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL));
+
+ /*
+ * First write extensions, then the total length
+ */
+ ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM)
+ ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite =
+ mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
+ if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) {
+ ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen))
+ != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen);
+ ext_len += olen;
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ ext_len));
+
+ if (ext_len > 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0);
+ p += 2 + ext_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello"));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));
+
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
+ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
+ int authmode;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request"));
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) {
+ authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
+ } else
+#endif
+ authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
+
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) ||
+ authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 0 . 0 handshake type
+ * 1 . 3 handshake length
+ * 4 . 4 cert type count
+ * 5 .. m-1 cert types
+ * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only)
+ * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only)
+ * n .. n+1 length of all DNs
+ * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1
+ * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1
+ * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc.
+ */
+ buf = ssl->out_msg;
+ p = buf + 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Supported certificate types
+ *
+ * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
+ * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType;
+ */
+ ct_len = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+
+ p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++;
+ p += ct_len;
+
+ sa_len = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2)
+ *
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * HashAlgorithm hash;
+ * SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+ * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+ *
+ * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm;
+ * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm;
+ */
+ const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl);
+ if (sig_alg == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+ }
+
+ for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) {
+ unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg);
+
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the
+ * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the
+ * partial list including that element. */
+ sa_len += 2;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len);
+
+ }
+
+ /* Fill in list length. */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0);
+ sa_len += 2;
+ p += sa_len;
+
+ /*
+ * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
+ */
+ p += 2;
+
+ total_dn_size = 0;
+
+ if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) {
+ /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned
+ * via a CA callback (configured through
+ * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the
+ * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) {
+ crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) {
+ crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints;
+ } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
+ crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+ } else
+#endif
+ crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+
+ while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) {
+ /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length
+ * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */
+ dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len;
+
+ if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short"));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+ memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size);
+ p += dn_size;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size);
+
+ total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size);
+ crt = crt->next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request"));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED))
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
+ size_t key_len;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ uint16_t tls_id = 0;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
+
+ switch (pk_type) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in
+ * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes);
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes);
+
+ if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
+ /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS)
+ * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags
+ * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id;
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK
+ * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need
+ * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with
+ * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type
+ * and bits that we just got above. */
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type));
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+ status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len,
+ &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty
+ * to clear it exit. */
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+ grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
+ if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id);
+ if (tls_id == 0) {
+ /* This elliptic curve is not supported */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will
+ be, so there is no need to check the return value here */
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type,
+ &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+ ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type));
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(key, &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len,
+ &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ default:
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+ if (private_key == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)),
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t *signature_len)
+{
+ /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
+ * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
+ * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
+ * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
+ * ssl->out_msglen. */
+ unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2;
+ size_t sig_max_len = (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+ - sig_start);
+ int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl,
+ sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len);
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
+
+/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including
+ * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the
+ * signature and sending the message. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t *signature_len)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+ (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ (void) signature_len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#else
+ size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */
+
+ /*
+ *
+ * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite.
+ *
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * - ECJPAKE key exchanges
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+ unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN -
+ ssl->out_msglen;
+ size_t output_offset = 0;
+ size_t output_len = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The first 3 bytes are:
+ * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE
+ * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID
+ *
+ * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its
+ * TLS ID here
+ */
+ uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
+ if (tls_id == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1);
+ output_offset += 3;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx,
+ out_p + output_offset,
+ end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len,
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+ psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ output_offset += output_len;
+ ssl->out_msglen += output_offset;
+#else
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(
+ &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ssl->out_msglen += len;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+ /*
+ * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support
+ * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature,
+ * we use empty support identity hints here.
+ **/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+ /*
+ * - DHE key exchanges
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ephemeral DH parameters:
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
+ * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
+ * } ServerDHParams;
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ &ssl->conf->dhm_P,
+ &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params(
+ &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx),
+ ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+#endif
+
+ ssl->out_msglen += len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */
+
+ /*
+ * - ECDHE key exchanges
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ /*
+ * Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ */
+ uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id;
+ const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl);
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */
+ if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
+ }
+ for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) {
+ for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id;
+ *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) {
+ if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) {
+ goto curve_matching_done;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+curve_matching_done:
+ if (*curr_tls_id == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s",
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id)));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+ uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+ const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2),
+ // data length(1)
+ const size_t data_length_size = 1;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+ size_t ec_bits = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation."));
+
+ /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id,
+ &key_type,
+ &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse."));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type;
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits;
+
+ key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type);
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits);
+
+ /*
+ * ECParameters curve_params
+ *
+ * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve
+ */
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+
+ /*
+ * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0);
+ p += 2;
+
+ /* Generate ECDH private key. */
+ status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes,
+ &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ECPoint public
+ *
+ * First byte is data length.
+ * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location.
+ */
+
+ /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
+ * Make one byte space for the length.
+ */
+ unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size;
+
+ size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+ - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg));
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+ own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
+ &len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret);
+ (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the length of the exported public key. */
+ *p = (uint8_t) len;
+
+ /* Determine full message length. */
+ len += header_size;
+#else
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ curr_grp_id)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(
+ &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len,
+ ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen;
+#endif
+
+ ssl->out_msglen += len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */
+
+ /*
+ *
+ * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the
+ * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here.
+ *
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ if (dig_signed == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed);
+ size_t hashlen = 0;
+ unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /*
+ * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm:
+ * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
+ * to choose appropriate hash.
+ */
+
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg =
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info);
+
+ unsigned char sig_hash =
+ (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
+ ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg));
+
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash);
+
+ /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension
+ * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */
+ if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ /* (... because we choose a cipher suite
+ * only if there is a matching hash.) */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg));
+
+ /*
+ * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed
+ */
+ if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen,
+ dig_signed,
+ dig_signed_len,
+ md_alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen);
+
+ /*
+ * 2.3: Compute and add the signature
+ */
+ /*
+ * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through
+ * a prefix to the signature.
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * HashAlgorithm hash;
+ * SignatureAlgorithm signature;
+ * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
+ * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } DigitallySigned;
+ *
+ */
+
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg);
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) {
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
+ md_alg, hash, hashlen);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
+ /* act as if f_async_sign was null */
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+ return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len);
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the
+ * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange
+ * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange.
+ * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing
+ * ssl->out_msglen. */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl),
+ md_alg, hash, hashlen,
+ ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2,
+ out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2,
+ signature_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng,
+ ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites
+ * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either
+ * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state
+ * machine. */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t signature_len = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
+ /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange
+ * is not needed. */
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters
+ * from certificate at this point. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */
+
+ /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use
+ * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing
+ * signature operation, resume signing. */
+ if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation"));
+ ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
+ } else
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) &&
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */
+ {
+ /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */
+ ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen
+ * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message,
+ * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be
+ * preserved. */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange (pending)"));
+ } else {
+ ssl->out_msglen = 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* If there is a signature, write its length.
+ * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature
+ * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
+ if (signature_len != 0) {
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(signature_len);
+ ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(signature_len);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature",
+ ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen,
+ signature_len);
+
+ /* Skip over the already-written signature */
+ ssl->out_msglen += signature_len;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
+
+ /* Add header and send. */
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange"));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done"));
+
+ ssl->out_msglen = 4;
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE;
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
+ (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done"));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ size_t n;
+
+ /*
+ * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P
+ */
+ if (*p + 2 > end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0);
+ *p += 2;
+
+ if (*p + n > end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ *p += n;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *peer_pms,
+ size_t *peer_pmslen,
+ size_t peer_pmssize)
+{
+ int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl,
+ peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize);
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0;
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL);
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char *peer_pms,
+ size_t *peer_pmslen,
+ size_t peer_pmssize)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl);
+ if (own_cert == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no local certificate"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk;
+ mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl);
+ size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing
+ * decryption operation, resume signing. */
+ if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation"));
+ return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl,
+ peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
+ */
+ if (p + 2 > end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) ||
+ *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (p + len != end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the premaster secret
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) {
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl),
+ p, len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH:
+ /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+ return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl,
+ peer_pms,
+ peer_pmslen,
+ peer_pmssize);
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS:
+ ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS;
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len,
+ peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t pms_offset)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
+ unsigned char ver[2];
+ unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
+ size_t peer_pmslen;
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff;
+
+ /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
+ * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
+ * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
+ * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0.
+ * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This
+ * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory,
+ * even if it's an unsigned char). */
+ peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
+ peer_pmslen = 0;
+
+ ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end,
+ peer_pms,
+ &peer_pmslen,
+ sizeof(peer_pms));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport,
+ ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version);
+
+ /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid
+ * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type
+ * attacks. */
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret);
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48));
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0]));
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1]));
+
+ /*
+ * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
+ * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
+ * bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
+ * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must
+ * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was
+ * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret,
+ * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not.
+ */
+ ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal
+ * anything about the RSA decryption. */
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
+ if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset ||
+ sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
+
+ /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without
+ * data-dependent branches. */
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ uint16_t n;
+
+ if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Receive client pre-shared key identity name
+ */
+ if (end - *p < 2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0);
+ *p += 2;
+
+ if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) {
+ if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear,
+ * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */
+ if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len ||
+ mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n);
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY;
+ }
+
+ *p += n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
+ unsigned char *p, *end;
+
+ ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange"));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED))
+ if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) &&
+ (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) {
+ /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous
+ * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the
+ * record. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record"));
+ } else
+#endif
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+ end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
+
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster,
+ MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
+ &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
+ ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++);
+ size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p);
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key."));
+
+ /*
+ * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data)
+ */
+ if (buf_len < 2) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ buf_len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ data_len, buf_len));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
+ if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
+ data_len,
+ sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+ memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len;
+
+ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement(
+ PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster),
+ &handshake->pmslen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret);
+ if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) {
+ (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ }
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) {
+ status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+ (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+ key_exchange)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+ if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) {
+ /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to
+ * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip
+ * directly to resuming this operation. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed"));
+ /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
+ * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */
+ p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2;
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+ (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+ key_exchange)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+ size_t pms_len;
+
+ /* Write length only when we know the actual value */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
+ pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0);
+ pms += 2 + pms_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K);
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+ (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+ key_exchange)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint8_t ecpoint_len;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
+
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+ psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
+ if (p >= end) {
+ psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ecpoint_len = *(p++);
+ if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) {
+ psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account
+ the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits.
+ The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any
+ possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+ if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
+ psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ }
+#else
+ MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX,
+ "peer key buffer too small");
+#endif
+
+ memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
+ p += ecpoint_len;
+
+ /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
+ * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
+ * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
+ * - the PSK itself
+ */
+ unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster;
+ const unsigned char * const psm_end =
+ psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster);
+ /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
+ const size_t zlen_size = 2;
+ size_t zlen = 0;
+
+ /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
+ status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH,
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey,
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey,
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len,
+ psm + zlen_size,
+ psm_end - (psm + zlen_size),
+ &zlen);
+
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey);
+ handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status);
+ }
+
+ /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0);
+ psm += zlen_size + zlen;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl,
+ (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info->
+ key_exchange)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) {
+ if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
+ &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p),
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password);
+ psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx);
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ p, (size_t) (end - p));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
+ ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
+ ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+ {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange"));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));
+
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ size_t i, sig_len;
+ unsigned char hash[48];
+ unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+ const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
+ ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
+ mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify"));
+
+ if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify"));
+ ssl->state++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */);
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ssl->state++;
+
+ /* Process the message contents */
+ if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
+ ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+ i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
+ * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } DigitallySigned;
+ */
+ if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Hash
+ */
+ md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]);
+
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
+ " for verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) {
+ hash_start += 16;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
+ hashlen = 0;
+
+ i++;
+
+ /*
+ * Signature
+ */
+ if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i]))
+ == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
+ " for verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
+ */
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ i++;
+
+ if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i);
+ i += 2;
+
+ if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message"));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate hash and verify signature */
+ {
+ size_t dummy_hlen;
+ ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen);
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk,
+ md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
+ ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl);
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify"));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t tlen;
+ uint32_t lifetime;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket"));
+
+ ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
+ ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
+ * } NewSessionTicket;
+ *
+ * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified)
+ * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n)
+ * 10 . 9+n ticket content
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time();
+#endif
+ if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket,
+ ssl->session_negotiate,
+ ssl->out_msg + 10,
+ ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN,
+ &tlen, &lifetime)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret);
+ tlen = 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8);
+ ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and
+ * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state.
+ */
+ ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket"));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+/*
+ * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state));
+
+ switch (ssl->state) {
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * <== ClientHello
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
+ ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl);
+ break;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * ==> ServerHello
+ * Certificate
+ * ( ServerKeyExchange )
+ * ( CertificateRequest )
+ * ServerHelloDone
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
+ ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
+ ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
+ ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * <== ( Certificate/Alert )
+ * ClientKeyExchange
+ * ( CertificateVerify )
+ * ChangeCipherSpec
+ * Finished
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
+ ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
+ ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * ==> ( NewSessionTicket )
+ * ChangeCipherSpec
+ * Finished
+ */
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) {
+ ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+ } else
+#endif
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
+ ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done"));
+ ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state));
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order)
+{
+ conf->respect_cli_pref = order;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */